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INTERNATIONAL

The Food Crisis in Sub-Saharan
Africa
By Wilfred L. David

uring the past several years world
attention has become riveted to the
stark and startling pictures portray
ing the ravages of famine and drought in
Ethiopia and other countries in Sub-Sa
haran Africa. Many have died, and many
more have been threatened by poverty,
disease, and malnutrition.
The rains have now fallen in many areas,
and some countries now report green fields
and bumper harvests. While this may be a
visible sign of recovery, the fundamental
problem of food insecurity still remains.
New approaches to development are
needed to effectively combat the inevitable
disasters wrought by nature, by man, and a
generalized African penury.
The attainment of “food security” is a
primary objective of development. Food
security connotes a situation in which all
people at all times have access to enough
food for an active and healthy life. By
contrast, “food insecurity” means a lack of
access to enough food. It has both tempo
rary and chronic dimensions. In the former
case, people’s access to food may decline in
the short run due to an instability in food
production, escalating food prices, periodic
unemployment, and so on. Famine repre
sents the worst form of this temporary food
insecurity.
Chronic food insecurity is reflected in
continuously inadequate diets caused by the
inability to acquire enough food. This af
fects people who persistently lack the
ability either to grow their own food or to
buy it. It may manifest itself in a variety of
ways, including: chronic malnutrition, de
clining food production per capita, environ
mental damage (desertification, deforesta
tion), growing reliance on imports of food
staples, rising food aid requirements, in
creasing foreign debt, and overall economic
stagnation and decline.
An inordinate degree of attention has
been focused on the short-term crises and
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temporary food insecurity, e.g., the late
1960s famine in Biafra (Nigeria) due to a
civil war, the calamities that befell the
Sahelian countries and Ethiopia between
1968 and 1972, and the “Great Famine” of
1984-1986.
However, these examples have become
poignant reminders of the fact that huge
areas of the African continent are famineprone, and that in practically all countries
severe and recurrent food shortages may
have become endemic. Elements of the
longer term crisis have been less obvious to
the casual observer. For more than two
decades, gradual changes in economic and
ecological relationships have continuously
threatened the stability and existence of
societies. With the imponderable strains
put on national and local food systems,
many countries have increasingly lost the
ability to improve the living standards of the
masses of the population.
The U.N. Food and Agricultural Organi
zation (FAO) has reported that about 214
million people living in 24 countries in SubSaharan Africa now experience severe
forms of food insecurity. More than 150
million people in these countries face en
ergy-deficient diets, i.e., they are not con
suming enough calories for an active work
ing life. Of these, about 90 million or 25
percent of the population do not get enough
calories to prevent stunted growth and
other health risks. These estimates do not
include the long-term effects of malnutri
tion, such as increased susceptibility to
crippling and fatal disease, brain damage,
retardation, and other forms of deformity.
Therefore, there is a need to explore
some of the deeper causes of food inse
curity in Sub-Saharan Africa, the policy
changes required, and the prospects for
solving the crisis that these policies offer.
The underlying problems are complex,
and coming to grips with them requires a
multifaceted political economy approach.
Within the bounds of such a broad struc

tural approach, the centrality of agriculture
in improving food security and raising the
basic standard of living should be recog
nized.
Agriculture is the mainstay of the Af
rican economy, and provides the principal
means through which the continent partici
pates in the world economy. However, SubSaharan Africa is the only region in the
world that today grows less food than it did
in the 1960s.
Causes of the Food Crisis

The causes of the food crisis include a
multiplicity of internal and external factors
that continue to affect the structure and
performance of the agricultural sector in
particular, and the behavior of the overall
economic system and society. In general,
these include: poverty; international eco
nomic and political processes; global reces
sion; serious natural, economic, and politi
cal disasters; population growth; national
politics and government policies; social
relations; and the technical possibilities
facing the agricultural sector.
Indeed, poverty remains the major cause
of hunger, famine, and other forms of food
insecurity. Rarely do middle class and
wealthy people go hungry in countries
experiencing drought, famine, or food
shortages. Food is usually available to the
monied class. It is the poor who go hungry,
who even in normal times tend to exist at
the margins of national economies.
The poor in Sub-Saharan Africa have
average incomes of just above $200 per
year, and live predominantly in rural areas.
Very little has been done to enhance the
socioeconomic conditions and life chances
of these rural masses, who constitute 80-90
percent of the continent’s population. By
and large, they subsist on uneconomically
small holdings or as landless laborers. The
typical rural dweller remains a citizen in
name only; he/she is neglected and/or
forgotten, especially in the distribution of

the national dividend to which he/she is also
a contributor.
In every known society, especially in
market-oriented economies based on pri
vate ownership, how much food people can
command depends on (a) ownership rights,
i.e., what they own, and (b) their exchange
entitlements, i.e., what they can get in
exchange for what they own through trade,
production, or both.1 In such a situation,
people can face starvation and other forms
of food insecurity for either of two reasons.
On the one hand, their ownership rights
may collapse. Such rights define the system
of income and asset distribution and repre
sent rules about who ought to get what
under what circumstances.2 They are cre
ated in political practice, and are embodied
in beliefs and rules as reflected in legal and
economic processes, e.g., land tenure rules,
notions about family obligations, wage
rates, rules about market transactions, and
so on. They are specific to particular
historical circumstances facing a given
country. In the African context, such rules
have increasingly discriminated against
peasant farmers.
On the other hand, exchange entitle
ments may collapse, e.g., through people
becoming unemployed. In the typical case,
this is accompanied by a lack of income to
purchase food, a general fall in the relative
price of goods, and an increase in food
prices. Thus, despite the total availability of
food in any particular area, people still may
go hungry because they cannot establish
their “entitlement” to the food they need.
When there is a general shortage, food
price, relative to other goods, is raised,
making affordability difficult for poor peo
ple. However, starvation can occur with
little or no rise in food prices. In the great
Ethiopian famines of the 1970s and 1980s,
hundreds of thousands died without any
sustained rise in food prices.
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African Agriculture and the Global
Political Economy

There is considerable discussion of the
impact of external factors and relationships
on African agriculture, and whether Africa
suffers from too much or too little integra
tion into the world capitalist economy. The
conventional wisdom is that current food
shortages and economic dependency have
their historical roots in the continent’s
incorporation into the world capitalist econ
omy.
Before colonialism, agriculture was the
primary economic activity in Africa. Rela
tively sophisticated indigenous techniques
had evolved — techniques that were suited
to the needs of the people and their fragile
ecosystems, and that helped them to cope
with cyclical droughts and crop failures due
to other causes. Adequate food security and
self-reliance were common before Euro
pean colonization. Effective methods had
been developed for storage of food sur
pluses, and complex patterns of trade had
evolved around food availability. Within the
existing system, population, resources, and
technology were linked, and African so
cieties shaped their agrarian institutions
accordingly.
Colonialism introduces a system for ex
tracting wealth from the continent. Agri
cultural products and raw materials became
an integral part of this wealth. Colonial
powers encouraged forms of production
that met their own needs and tastes, not the
needs of the African people. Colonial gov
ernments mandated that cash crops be
planted for export, such as sugar, coffee,
sisal, cotton, and tobacco, which displaced
the production of food for local consump
tion.
Land with the greatest fertility and
agricultural potential was allocated to the
production of cash crops for export. As a
result, food production for local consump
tion has had to rely increasingly on new
cultivation in marginal rainfall zones and
areas less suitable for farming. The histor
ical process rendered food production more
precarious and initiated the deterioration of
these more fragile ecosystems.
Transportation networks were designed
to facilitate the flow of export crops and
other material goods between Africa and
Europe, and not to facilitate the broadbased development of Africa.
The structural forms of dependency
initiated during the colonial period have
been heightened in post-colonial Africa.
The cash crop system remains a reality
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today in much of Africa, and agricultural
exports are the primary source of foreign
currency earnings. For example, Ethiopia,
a country that has suffered the severest
shortages of food, continues to grow coffee
for export to industrialized nations and
vegetables for consumption in Europe.
Successive world recessions have driven
down the prices of export crops in world
markets. At the same time, there have been
asymmetric increases in the prices which
Africa has had to pay for essential imports

Colonialism introduced a
system for extracting
wealth from the continent.
Agricultural products and
raw materials became an
integral part of this
wealth.

most “debt-distressed” low-income African
countries face scheduled debt-service pay
ments in 1988-90 three times higher than
they were able to pay in 1985 (from $2.3
billion to $6.9 billion annually).
Between 1986 and February 1987, Af
rican countries transferred, on a net basis,
three and a half times as much money to the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) as they
received in 1985. Further, official lenders
account for more than three-quarters of the
debt service due for low-income countries
in Sub-Saharan Africa. Of this, about 20
percent is due to the IMF and 17 percent to
other multilateral agencies.
The combined effects of declining export
earnings, inadequate resource inflows, and
increasing debt service obligations have
forced many African countries to cut invest
ment and import levels, with detrimental
effects on growth and development. The
heavy burden of the foreign debt has given
rise to substantial rescheduling and ac
cumulation of arrears. Where new loans
take the form of rescheduling, banks and
other creditors are in fact lending money to
themselves. In other words, countries use
the new money to meet interest payments
on old loans, which remain active.
Population Pressure, Natural and
Man-Made Disasters

of consumer, intermediate, and capital
goods, especially farm and transport ma
chinery.
The Report of the International Con
ference on African Economic Recovery,
organized by the UN Economic Commis
sion for Africa in June, 1987, drew attention
to the fact that the prices of Africa’s
principal commodity exports plummeted to
their lowest level in 30 years. Total export
receipts fell by $19 billion, from $65 billion
in 1985 to $46 billion in 1987. Meanwhile,
the prices of imported manufactured goods
increased by 20 percent. According to the
World Bank, this resulted in a 1986 deterio
ration, in the terms of trade, of about 32
percent. Needless to say, such a blow would
be hard enough to bear even for the richest
countries.
The situation also has been compounded
by Africa’s severe debt problem. The UN
Economic Commission for Africa has esti
mated that the total foreign debt of Africa
may have reached $200 billion.
A particularly disturbing aspect of the
debt situation is that countries have to
borrow more and more to pay off old loans.
The World Bank has reported that the 17

Africa has a population of more than 500
million people, which is expected to exceed
800 million by the end of the century. In
Sub-Saharan Africa, where the food prob
lem is most acute, the population will have
increased from an estimated 350 million in
1980 to more than 640 million by the year
2000. With food production and availability
already chronically deficient, there is no
likelihood that conditions will improve dra
matically over the medium term without
radical changes in a number of areas.
Africa’s population growth is one of the
highest in the world. It has been accelerat
ing at about 2.5 percent per annum in 1960
to about 3-4 percent per annum during the
1980s. If this rate continues, the current
population will double in just 22 years.
Therefore, population control is frequently
advocated.
The rapid population growth in Africa
results both from a steady fall in death rates
and increases in birth rates. By contrast,
both birth and death rates have been
declining in other continents, especially in
the developed world.
Several important factors explain the
apparent uniqueness of the African situa

tion. First, population pressure is integrally
connected with the nature of the agri
cultural economy and social institutions.
Since most Africans make their living from
the land, child labor is a valuable resource
for tending food and cash crops, herding
livestock, and helping with daily chores of
fetching water and firewood. Having several
children can be a considerable help to the
typical rural family. Second, many African
societies tend to equate large families with
wealth and power. Third, having many
children is linked to the traditional role of
women in society.
In many African countries, women do
most of the farming and other household
chores, notwithstanding the cumulative
physical strain of repeated pregnancies.
Under the circumstances, women tend to
want children for economic reasons, and for
protection and support in their old age.
Children are also desirable for social rea
sons, since women’s standing in the family
and community is closely linked to their
ability to bear children.
In historical terms, the high birth rates in
Africa are somewhat related to centuries of
experience. Such high birth rates have been
dictated by the absolute necessity to com
pensate for devastatingly high infant mor
tality rates, and to replace populations
regularly decimated by drought and dis
ease. In this context, it is estimated that of
the 7 million or so children under the age of
2 who will die yearly throughout the world,
about 5 million will be Africans.
Even with the highest population growth
rate in the world, Africa still remains the
region with the lowest population density.
The African continent as a whole contains
about 20 percent of the world’s cultivable
land and about 9 percent of its people. SubSaharan Africa has fewer than 60 people
per 100 hectares of cultivable land, com
pared to an average ratio of 180 people per
100 hectares for all developing countries.
However, the distribution of arable land
does not coincide with the distribution of
the population. This historical disparity has
been maintained by political borders, tribal
and linguistic differences, poor internal
transportation, and endemic diseases, par
ticularly in the humid and semi-humid
zones of Central and West Africa.
Population growth is a strategic factor in
the African food crisis. For one, it imposes
serious constraints on the amount of food
that is available. However, its impact should
be analyzed in terms of the skewed system
of land distribution in African countries.

While population density in most countries
remains relatively low, population growth
continues to improse increasing pressures
on the available land resources.
One result has been the irreversible
ecological damage caused by deforestation,
as people search for new lands on which to
subsist. Most serious is the loss of soil
fertility and soil erosion on deforested
lands. In its extreme form, the loss of soil
fertility turns land into desert. If that
occurs on a large scale, it can reduce

The combined effects of
declining export earnings,
inadequate resource in
flows, and increasing debt
service obligations have
forced many African coun
tries to cut investment
and import levels . . .

rainfall, thereby reinforcing existing tend
encies toward drought in many parts of
Africa. Some analysts believe that this
factor best explains the severity of recent
droughts in many parts of Africa.
Drought remains one of the primary
reasons for the African food disaster, and its
impact cannot be minimized. Many parts of
Africa are considered areas of marginal
rainfall so that disruption of rain patterns in
one year tends to produce a cumulative
effect, decreasing the ability of the land to
sustain any kind of prolonged agricultural
activity. For many consecutive years, rains
have failed in the corn and grain belts of
several African countries. This has dras
tically affected food production, and future
production is threatened by wind erosion
and lack of soil regeneration.
Just as it impedes the production of food,
drought, along with deforestation, has a
direct impact on another vital resource,
firewood, which accounts for about 75
percent of Africa’s energy use. Deforesta
tion was already a problem before the
droughts, as demand exceeded the capacity
of woodlands to replenish themselves.

The cutting and burning of timber has
contributed significantly to the increased
desertification of a number of areas. Even
marginal lands, without trees, are further
deprived of the means of maintaining and
building up fragile layers of topsoil. The
point is that deforestation can contribute to
drought by influencing water retention and
evaporation rates.
Finally, many countries in Africa that are
unable to feed their populations are also
involved in wars, civil strife, or external or
internal threats to their stability and secu
rity. For many years, Ethiopia has been
involved in military conflict with Somalia,
and with separatist or autonomist move
ments in Eritrea and Tigray. This situation
has created millions of refugees. And young
men are taken from the already fragile
agricultural economy to bear arms and
fight. Farmlands have either become battle
zones or have been abandoned. The result
is a simultaneous increase in the demand on
the food supply and a decrease in the
capacity for production. Thus, in addition to
those fleeing drought, another class of
refugees has been created — those fleeing
famine and war.
The situation facing the nations of South
ern Africa also deserves mention. For
example, Mozambique, one of the countries
hardest hit by drought and food shortages,
is at the same time confronted with South
African-backed guerilla forces that are
wreaking havoc on the nation’s economy
and infrastructure. South Africa, which
supports dissident forces in nations to its
north, is also involved in the destabilization
of their economies. Paradoxically, these
policies work to assure continued economic
dependency by the frontline states on
South Africa — as buffers against the
movement for majority rule in South Af
rica, as markets for its products, and as
suppliers of cheap migrant labor for its gold
mines and industry.
Therefore, the correlation between hun
ger and military conflict cannot be over
emphasized. The terrible consequences of
militarism and fighting, combined with
cyclical droughts and the negative impact of
inappropriate development, continue to
make millions of people vulnerable to hun
ger and starvation.
Nations involved in military conflict, or
which face concentrated destabilization,
end up channeling their already meager
national resources into building large ar
mies and massive military hardware. As the
Ethiopian experience continues to reveal,
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when famine conditions develop, relief
efforts are complicated by military pri
orities, instability, and insecurity.

Technology and Food Production
Systems

The poor food production record in Africa
is also partly explained by a variety of
technical factors. While some of these
factors are specific to the structure of the
African environment, others reflect contra
dictions between the food production sys
tems in the developed and developing world,
and the lack of appropriate technological
diffusion between these two sectors.
The technical factors affecting produc
tion and productivity include: the inade
quate spread of improved technology, the
prevalence of pest damage and disease,
inappropriate and inadequate agricultural
research, poor agricultural extension pro
grams, and the lack of infrastructure. In the
latter context, food availability in Africa has
suffered not only because of a lag in food
production, but also because a large part of
the small amount that is produced never
reaches the consumers. In many parts of
the continent, more than one-third of the
potential harvest of certain crops is wasted
before harvest (in the harvesting process or
during the subsequent phases prior to final
consumption).
Technological progress for improved sta
ple food crop production has been limited or
almost non-existent. While hybrid maize
and other types of technology have been
introduced in some countries, there have
been few breakthroughs in breeding im
proved crop varieties with higher yields. In
general, the African production environ
ment is highly inflexible. As a result, it has
been unable to respond to changing market
conditions by introducing more productive
varieties of old crops or new high demand
ones.
The African food crisis reflects a basic
contradiction in the global food production
system. There is enough food in the world.
Due to scientific and technical advances,
global food production has tended to out
pace the unprecedented population growth
of the past four decades, and for the first
time more food is being produced than the
world needs. Enough food is available so
that countries which do not produce all of
their food needs can import food if they can
afford to do so.
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These trends should be interpreted from
the wider perspective of the three agri
cultural revolutions that the world has
witnessed, and which have virtually by
passed the African continent. The first was
marked by a change from animal to mechan
ical power during the first four decades of
the 19th century, and which is still taking
place in many parts of the developing world.
The second revolution was linked to the

In order to protect the
welfare of middle class
consumers, payments of
procurement prices to
farmers have been kept
low, and below market
levels.

creation and widespread use of modern
agricultural inputs—high-yielding varieties
of seed, fertilizers, pesticides, etc. — after
the Second World War. The third revolution
has been based on improved plant genetics.
The use of a variety of plant breeding
techniques and genetic engineering have
helped to produce crops that grow faster,
are less expensive to plant, and are more
resistant to harsh weather, pests, and
diseases.

Politics and the Policies of
African Governments

A general claim is that African govern
ments tend to pursue economic and political
priorities that are at variance with the food
needs of their populations or the interests of
subsistence farmers. There is now a consid
erable debate on the negative effects of
government intervention on agricultural
performance and food production. This
intervention has taken many forms, but the
policies listed below have received wide
spread attention.

Many African governments, as a matter
of deliberate policy, have kept official food
prices for certain staples generally low, with
the objective of avoiding civil disturbances
and ensuring cheap food for the urban
middle class. On a related basis, govern
ment marketing agencies and parastatal
organizations frequently import food and
sell at a loss.
In order to protect the welfare of middle
class consumers, payments of procurement
or producer prices to farmers have been
kept low, and below market levels. In some
countries, e.g., Ethiopia, governments
have for many years forced farmers to sell
much of their harvested surpluses to the
state at artificially low prices. In addition,
peasant farmers are required to deliver a
state-determined quota of grain to the state
purchasing agency, which pays at the low
official rate.
The parastatal organizations have been
characterized almost everywhere by cor
ruption, inefficiency, and mismanagement.
In many cases, their expenses are consider
ably higher than their revenues from crop
sales, with the financial losses subsidized by
the government. The result has been a
consistent tendency toward nonpayment,
late payment, or partial payment to farm
ers. Therefore, farmers have become prone
to divert their food surpluses to the private
“parallel” or “black” market, or otherwise
smuggle their produce to neighboring
countries where they can obtain higher
prices.
The currencies of most African coun
tries have become overvalued. Where a
currency is overvalued, a hidden tax is
placed on producers of export crops. It has
the same disincentive effect on agricultural
production as when producer prices paid to
farmers are kept artificially low. It cheapens
the cost of imported food and therefore sets
an unfair competition with domestic food
production. In general, currency over
valuation provides a hidden subsidy to
urban consumers at the expense of rural
dwellers.
In the typical case, currency overvalua
tion is combined with taxes on agricultural
exports and import duties and quotas that
protect manufactured goods produced lo
cally against competition from imports.
This has formed an integral part of a
development strategy known as import
substitution industralization (I-S).
In the majority of cases, the I-S strat
egies have required high levels of tariffs for
new urban-based industries. As a result,

farmers have been confronted with ex
tremely high prices for the consumer goods
and agricultural inputs produced by these
industries.
The emphasis on import substitution
industrialization has produced an “urban
bias” in development policy, as well as
patterns of agricultural development that
consistently discriminate against small
farmers. Such patterns continue to be “bimodal” or dualistic in orientation, in the
sense that they encourage the development
of large capital-intensive farm units
alongside the capital-intensive urban indus
tries.
The prevalence of “bi-modal” patterns of
agricultural development is traceable to the
widespread belief that size and economies
of scale are important in agriculture. The
prevalent belief is that only large and fairly
capital-intensive farm units can be “mod
ern” and efficient. Not only do many
government officials in Africa share this
view, but it also has been vigorously pro
moted by international lending agencies
and transnational concerns who have a
vested interest in the preferential treatment
of large-scale farms.3
The emphasis on economies of scale has
also been a persistent tenet in Marxist
perspectives of agricultural development.
In both capitalist and socialist-oriented
countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, state
farms have been established because of the
presumed importance of economies of
scale, as well as to facilitate the purchase of
relatively cheap grain and other food staples
for urban consumers.
The concentration of scarce resources of
capital, foreign exchange, and trained man
power in a subsector of relatively large
mechanized state farms has been achieved
at the expense of depriving the majority of
the farm population of inputs and support
ing services needed to increase food pro
duction.
A more “uni-modal” pattern of agri
cultural development should be given top
priority. This connotes a steady but gradual
increase in food production and productiv
ity by the large number of small farmers
adopting innovations that are appropriate to
their labor-abundant and capital-scarce en
vironment.

Policy Changes and Responses

What is clear is that both temporary and
chronic forms of food insecurity in Sub-

Saharan Africa result from a complex of
interacting factors — external, internal,
man-made, natural, and environmental.
This problem must be addressed on a
systemic and sustained basis, requiring
policies and programs based on anticipa
tion, relief, prevention, and long-term de
velopment. This sets obligations not only
for African governments themselves, but
also for the larger international community.

If technological inputs
were raised to roughly the
level. . . of Latin America
and Southeast Asia . . .
Sub-Saharan Africa could
support nearly six times
its projected population.

In this context, it can be argued that the
nature of government policies should be
accorded primary attention, in the sense
that they usually set the stage for all forms
of food insecurity and farmers’ responses to
the problem.
As a first order of business, African
governments must put in mechanisms of
preparedness and relief to stem all forms of
temporary food insecurity, including fam
ine. Such measures, for example, early
warning systems about impending crises,
can help countries cope with early stages of
anticipated famine. Over the longer term,
policy emphasis must shift in the direction
of prevention by balancing the supply and
demand for food at higher levels.
In essence, prevention and the attain
ment of food security depend on the
possibilities offered for eradicating all forms
of poverty. This calls for broad-based pro
grams of agricultural, rural, and national
development that simultaneously raise per
capita food output and guarantee owner
ship rights and exchange entitlements.
Decisions have to be made about the types
of economic expansion that would lead to a
steady rise in real incomes in general, and in

that of the poor and vulnerable groups, in
particular.
A study by the FAO has investigated the
potential carrying capacity of the world’s
farmlands, defined as the number of people
that the land can feed. The study provides a
rough indication of the ability of countries
to feed themselves based on their own food
production capabilities. Its conclusion is
that Africa’s land can in theory support
several times the present population at
adequate nutritional levels.4
If Sub-Saharan Africa is treated as a unit,
and if all land with agricultural potential is
devoted to growing food, and if all techno
logical inputs remain low, Sub-Saharan
Africa could support a population at least
1.6 times larger than its projected popula
tion in the year 2000. If technological inputs
were raised to roughly the level used in
some parts of Latin America and Southeast
Asia, and if all available land were used
for food production, Sub-Saharan Africa
could support nearly she times its projected
population.
However, the achievement of this option
would require unprecedented levels of in
vestment in technology, irrigation, and
assistance to small farmers. Just to sustain
the inadequate current levels of nutrition,
agricultural production in Africa would
have to grow at a sustained rate above 3
percent per annum for at least the next 20
years. Only a few developing countries,
Mexico, the Philippines, and Thailand have
ever achieved agricultural growth of more
than 3 percent per year for more than two
decades.
Even with the most ambitious plans for
agricultural and national development, Af
rica would need substantial long-term de
velopment assistance for many years to
come. A fundamental aim of such assistance
should be food self-reliance for the millions
of Africans who are now dependent on
imported food. In this context, new pro
grams of debt relief and international finan
cial arrangements must be devised to free
the debtor nations of Africa.
Most official aid to Africa is now condi
tioned on the requirement that African
countries practice an export-oriented open
door policy, rather than take steps to
increase domestic food self-sufficiency. In
particular, the World Bank has emphasized
that Africa’s comparative advantage lies in
traditional export crops, and therefore that
it should rely more on free trade policies.5
co n tin u ed on p age 2 9
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